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Exculpatory Fairy Tales 
Roger Bernhardt 
The decision in Burnett v Chimney Sweep, LLC (2004) 123 CA4th 1057, 20 CR3d 562, 
reported at p , presents an uncomfortable dilemma to ny attorney who wants to save clients 
from  a fate similar to that which beset the landlor  in this case. Given that the exculpatory 
clause in Burnett failed to do its job, should practitioners address the problem by drafting better 
wording, or by advising their clients that such a clause will never afford them real protection? 
The exculpatory clause in Burnett, as quoted by the court, said:   
Lessor shall not be liable for injury or damage to the person or goods, wares, merchandise, or 
other property of Lessee, . . .  whether such damage or injury is caused by or results from fire, 
steam, electricity, gas, water or rain, or from the br akage, leakage, obstruction or other defects 
of pipes, fire sprinklers, wires, appliances, plumbing, air conditioning or lighting fixtures, or 
from any other cause, whether said injury or damage results from conditions arising upon the 
Premises or upon other portions of the Building of which the Premises are a part, from other 
sources or places, and regardless of whether the cause of such damage or injury or the means of 
repairing the same is accessible or not. . . . Notwithstanding Lessor’s negligence or breach of this 
Lease, Lessor shall under no circumstances be liable for injury to Lessee’s business or for any 
loss of income or profit therefrom. 
Despite its extensive language, the provision did not support a judgment on the pleadings 
against tenants who sued for personal injuries and property damage to their business inventory 
(and also, apparently, for having to quit the premises) as a result of toxic mold they discovered 
inside the store. 
Drafting Broader Language 
The strategy to improve the clause for landlords is not difficult to devise. The court’s opinion 
noted that the provision shielding the landlord from liability for property damage or personal 
injury did not specifically mention negligence. Because it is settled in California that if an 
exculpatory clause does not include that word it protects a landlord only from liability for 
passive negligence and not for active negligence, as w s involved here, the clause obviously 
failed to do its job. 
Although the second part of the provision—beginning with “Notwithstanding Lessor’s 
negligence”—clearly  did contain the magic word, the rest of the language protected the landlord 
only against liability for lost income and profits, not against liability for the personal injuries and 
property damage that was alleged. 
Because this combination of drafting errors meant tha he landlord could be held liable for 
personal and property damage that resulted from its ac ive negligence, better drafting could 
easily eliminate that gap. It requires little more than combining the two provisions into one, and 
not restricting the reference to negligence to only e type of liability. 
(I confess that I don’t see why the clause distinguished between personal and property damage 
on the one hand and income and business losses on the other. Nor can I figure out why 
“negligence” would be mentioned in the income/busine s loss second sentence but not in the 
personal/property damage first sentence. I suspect that years ago a careless lawyer copied the 
two sentences from two different forms and combined them without ever thinking about their 
asymmetry, and, ever since, other careless lawyers just inserted both sentences blindly into their 
own clients’ leases.) 
Indeed, given what the court said about the language in this lease, I can imagine a future 
landlord contending that its attorney was professionally negligent in continuing to use it as is. 
Advising the Client Not To Believe in the Protection of the Lease 
On the other hand, how much confidence should an attorney put into the effectiveness of an 
improved clause? I have serious doubts that a landlord could win a case like this no matter what 
its lease said. I do not believe our courts will permit a small shopkeeper’s business (here, a gift 
shop of 470 square feet inside a hotel) to be ruined by toxic mold coming from elsewhere in the 
building merely because of clever drafting in a printed form lease (the “Standard 
Industrial/Commercial Multi-Tenant Lease-Gross” involved here). 
A decade ago, in a pair of companion cases, our supreme court held, in one case, that the 
tenant was bound to pay the costs of asbestos removal, and, in the other, that the tenant did not 
have to pay for seismic retrofitting of an unreinforced masonry building, even though both 
tenants had the same “covenant to comply” clauses in their leases. See Brown v Green (1994) 8 
C4th 812, 35 CR3d 598, and Hadian v Schwartz (1994) 8 C4th 836, 35 CR3d 589. In Brown, 
Justice Arabian found that an earlier case’s statement of the previous rule—which had focused 
on the language of the lease—was “apt to be misinterpreted as one which, in the search for the 
parties’ intent, exalts a text-bound logic over a close consideration not only of the terms of the 
lease but of the circumstances surrounding its making.”  
Rather than follow a “text-bound logic” (i.e., look at what the lease said), the court said that i  
would consider “a handful of judicially developed circumstantial factors as a means of 
confirming that the allocation of risk suggested by the text of the lease accurately reflect[ed] the 
probable intent of the parties and [led] to a reason ble construction of the lease terms” (i.e., feel 
free to ignore what it said). 8 C4th at 845. In these two cases, the differing nature of the tenancies 
trumped the similar provisions in the lease documents a d thus produced different results. 
The situation in Burnett is a sort of mirror image of the repair issues covered by the supreme 
court. The question of who must cover the front-end costs of making repairs necessary for 
remediation is the converse of who must pay for the consequential costs of injuries that result 
when the repairs are not made. In Burnett, it is likely  that the hotel’s lease form also required the 
tenants to comply with all laws, and this case could have come up a year earlier in the posture of 
litigation over who had to pay for the mold remediation. If, under Hadian v Schwartz, it is clear 
that these one-year, $400-per-month tenants would not have been obliged to perform the 
necessary repairs in their 470-square-foot store, no matter what the “covenant to comply” clause 
said, then it is probable that they would not have had to suffer the consequences of 
nonremediation—again, regardless of what the exculpatory clause said. 
(In Brown v Green, the supreme court also said that it rejected a  “bright line” rule, under 
which the obligation to remove environmentally hazardous materials always falls on the lessor of 
commercial property unless the responsibility for their removal is explicitly allocated to the 
lessee by the text of the lease agreement. . . . Whether the parties actually intended the allocation 
of responsibilities suggested by the use of unqualified language in a lease is an inquiry better 
approached through the application of a handful of relevant factors than by a “four corners” 
analysis of the text that focuses exclusively on the interlocking provisions of the agreement itself 
and their legal consequences. Such an inquiry seems all the more appropriate in cases . . . 
involving the use of a so-called “form” lease, where the logic of preprinted terms may favor the 
interests of one party over that of the other and, even when interlineated by the parties, produce 
an unreasonable result.  
In Burnett, I believe that it was the “unreasonableness” of requiring these small-store 
merchants to go inside their walls (which were probably not even included in the space rented to 
them) to remove the mold that led the court of appel to conclude that the exculpatory clause did 
not protect their landlord.) 
One reason I think the Burnett decision is more likely attributable to the desire to avoid an 
unreasonable outcome than to faulty drafting in the exculpation language is the court’s further 
reasoning on its version of the issue. Having held that the clause only exculpated against passive 
negligence (because the clause was not specific enough to do more), the court then held that 
affirmative negligence had been alleged here. What was the affirmative negligence? “Based on 
the allegations in [tenants’] complaint, Chimney Sweep was actively negligent in refusing to 
remediate the problems caused by the excessive moisture and  mold infestation on the premises.” 
123 CA4th at 1067. That definition seems to me to convert every condition—even those 
passively generated—into affirmative negligence whenev r the tenants demand a repair and the 
landlord says “no.” I do not believe the court’s explanation is to be taken seriously. I am not a 
toxic tort lawyer, but I very much doubt that the migration of mold spores into a store space 
constitutes active negligence by anybody but the original responsible party. 
Acting on Both Fronts 
I am tempted to conclude that, for those cases where exculpatory clauses probably won’t 
accomplish their desired purpose, counsel for landlords should operate on a two-front basis: On 
the one hand, improve their clauses to shift as much responsibility over to the tenants as possible; 
on the other hand, they should advise their clients to take their own measures to maintain the 
structural and other common elements of their buildings in good condition (and purchase 
whatever insurance they can find). However, that strategy may carry its own dangers, since I 
suppose a clause can be made so exculpatory as to be held void as against public policy. 
Therefore, I will content myself with not trying to draft one myself, lest I be accused of 
spreading public immorality by doing so.  
